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Article
Judicial Vigilantism: Inherent Judicial
Authority to Appoint Contempt
Prosecutors in Young v. United States
ex rei Vuitton Et Fils S.A.
BY NEAL DEVINS*
AND STEVEN J MULROY**

INTRODUCTION

Inherent executive authonty and the separation of powers
have been Issues at the forefront of Supreme Court rulings these
past few years. 1 Flagship cases such as Immzgration and Naturalization Servzce v Chadha,2 Bowsher v Synar, 3 and Morrzson
v 0/sorf have ruled on such monumentous Issues as the "legIslative veto," the delegatiOn of budget-cuttmg authonty to the
Comptroller General, and the appomtment of special counsel to

* ASSistant Professor of Law and Research Fellow, Institute of Bill of Rights Law,
Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary. B.A., Georgetown
Umversity, 1978; J.D., Vanderbilt Umversity, 1982.
** Law Clerk to Honorable Roger S. Vinson, U.S. Distnct Court for the Northern
Distnct of Flonda (begmrung summer 1989). B.A., Cornell Uruversity, 1986; J.D.
candidate, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary. The authors
would like to thank John Garvey for hts useful comments and Ashley Kiesel for her
encouragement.
• See generally Miller, Independent Agenczes, 1986 SUP Cr. REv 41; Rabkm &
Devms, Averting Government by Consent Decree: Constitutional Lzmits on the Enforcement of Settlements with the Federal Government, 40 STAN. L. REv 203 (1987); Verkuil,
The Status of Independent Agenczes After Bowsher v. Synar, 1986 DUKE L.J. 779.
2 462 u.s. 919 (1983).
3 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
• 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
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Investigate and prosecute charges of cnmmal wrongdomg by
government officials. Among these sequmas of constitutiOnal
law, the Supreme Court qmetly resolved a conflict that pitted
executive prosecutonal discretiOn agamst the JUdiciary's Inherent
power to vmdicate Its own authonty Ansmg m a trademark
Infnngement case, the Court ruled m Young v Umted States ex
rei Vuztton Et Fils S.A. 5 that federal courts have Inherent power
to appomt pnvate counsel to prosecute an alleged contemnor
for violation of a court order 6
Only Justice Scalia took Issue wtth this aspect of the Court's
holding.7 Charactenzmg the maJority's mherent power argument
as mconsistent with the JUdiciary's passtve role, Justice Scalia
s 107 S. Ct. 2124 (1987).

Because our concern 1s this aspect of the Court's ruling, this Article will not
address court authority 10 "direct" contempt. Direct contempt 1s distinct from "indirect"
10 that the former takes place within the court's presence. See 8 FED. R. CruM. P 42(a);
8B J. MooRE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE f 42.02[3) (2d ed. 1987), Direct contempt
generally 10volves the disruption of courtroom proceedings, yet mdirect contempt IS the
out-of-court VIOlation of a court order. Because direct contempt proceedings are summary, court appo10tment of a prosecutor 1s unnecessary and the JUdicial appo10tment
power 1s not Implicated. Summary procedure, however, still giVes the JUdiciary authority
to mitiate prosecution.
Separation of powers problems are not reused by "direct" contempt. The Immediate
need to quell court disruption JUStifies the limited ability of the JUdiciary to "initiate
prosecution" for direct contempt. In fact, Justice Scalia recogmzed that each branch of
government "must each possess those powers necessary to protect the functiomng of its
own processes.'' Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2145 (Scalia, J., concumng). Consequently,
Young does not call 10to question "direct contempt" prosecutions agcunst those who
10terfere with the orderly conduct of JUdicial proceedings.
This Article, moreover, IS concerned solely with cnmmal contempt. Cnmmal contempt differs from ctvil contempt both 10 purpose and execution. Cnmmal contempt ts
punitive 10 nature. Cnmmal contempt sentences are for definite penods of time because
the goal1s deterrence of future violations. Civil contempt Is remedial m nature; sentences
may last only as long as the tnal 10volved but are 10determmate, because the obJect IS
to force the contemnor to comply with a court's order. Once the civil contemnor
complies, the penalty IS removed. J. MooRE, supra, at f 42.02[2]. Jailing a recalcitrant
witness until he testifies IS an example of ctvil contempt. Impnsomng someone who once
vtolated an mjunction for two years IS an example of cnmmal contempt.
7
Justice Scalia agreed with the Young majority that the distnct court committed
error when it sought to excuse the enforcement of the ongmal order by appomting the
plcuntiff's attorney m the underlymg trademark suit. This appomtment of an mterested
party created a conflict of mterest undenrumng the contempt prosecution. See Young,
107 S. Ct. at 2135-38. Justices Powell, O'Connor, White, and Chief Justice Rehnqu1st,
however, mdicated that the maJority erred m assuming that plruntiff's counsel could not
serve as a dismterested prosecutor. /d. at 2147-48 (Powell, Rehnqutst, & O'Connor,
J.J., concumng 10 part and dissenting m part); 1d. at 2148 (White, J., dissenting).
6
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asserted that the enforcement of court orders Is a task reserved
to the executive.8 In our view~ Justice Scalia IS nght. Because of
the traditionally Jealous reservation of prosecutonal discretiOn
to the executive and the similanty between cnmmal contempts
and regular cnmes, the Young ma]onty's "necessity" ratiOnale
does not overnde valid separation of powers concerns.
This Article will be divided mto three sections. SectiOn I will
set out the conflict resolved m Young-contrastmg the court's
cnmmal contempt power with traditiOnal prosecutonal discretion. Sections II and III will consider possible JUstifications for
this divergence. Section II will consider whether contempts are
mnately different from cnmes In a way that reduces separation
of powers concerns. Section III will address the possibility that
the JUdicial branch has a uruque, mherent, and overnding need
for a power of self-vmdicat10n. It Is our conclusiOn that neither
of these ratiOnales support the abandonment of traditional prosecutonal discretiOn.
I.

CRIMINAL CoNTEMPT AND THE SEPARATION OF PoWERS

The Supreme Court has long held that the JUdiciary has an
mherent power to purush contempts. 9 This power has been construed by lower courts to Imply an authonty to mitlate proceedmgs, which m turn supports JUdicial appomtment of prosecutors. 10

• An analogous controversy has recently emerged with respect to the c1vil contempt
power of bankruptcy JUdges. See Feder & Feder, Judges• Disputed Contempt Power
Supported by High Court Rulings, NAT'L L.J., April 25, 1988, at 26-29.
9
See, e.g., Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958); Michaelson v. United
States ex ref. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 266 U.S. 42 (1924); Gompers v. Bucks
Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 4I8 (1911); United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (I906);
Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1988); Ex parte Robmson, 86 U.S. 505 (1873); Anderson
v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821).
10
See, e.g., In re Brown, 454 F.2d 999 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Conole,
365 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. demed, 385 U.S. 1025 (1967); In re Fletcher, 216 F.2d
915, 917 {4th Cir. 1954), cert. demed, 348 U.S. 931 (1955); Uruted States ex ref. Brown
v. Lederer, 140 F.2d 136, 138 (7th Cir.), cert. demed, 322 U.S. 734 {1944); Western
Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Gotfned, 136 F.2d 98, 100-01 {9th Cir. 1943); O'Malley v. United
States, 128 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1942), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom. Pendergast v.
United States, 317 U.S. 412 (1943); McCann v. New York Stock Exch., 80 F.2d 211 (2d
Cir. 1935), cert. demed, 299 U.S. 603 (1936). See generally Recent Developments,
Crzmma/ Contempt: Federal Courts Power to DismiSS Proceeding Before Tnal, 66
CoLtJM. L. REv 182 (1966).
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While the Supreme Court has recogmzed that Congress may
regulate this power, 11 the Court has never suggested that the
legislature may abrogate It. 12 Indeed, both the majonty and
Justice Scalia agreed m Young v Umted States ex rei Vuitton
Et Fils S.A. 13 that perceived mherent JUdicial authority underlies
the Federal Rules of Cnmmal Procedure,s14 assumptiOn that a
JUdge may appOint pnvate counsel to prosecute an Indirect contempt.15 The fact that a United States Attorney had previously
declined to prosecute the alleged contemnor Is Irrelevant to this
formulatton. 16
11

See Bloom v. Illino1s, 391 U.S. 194, 196 n.I (1968); Michaelson, 266 U.S. at

65-67.
In Michaelson, the Court recogruzed that Congress could prohibit Court mitiated
contempt "where the act or thmg constituting the contempt IS also a cnme m the
ordinary sense." Michaelson, 266 U.S. at 66. Michaelson, however, emphasized that thls
legislative restnction m 18 U.S.C. § 401 did not question federal court authority to
pumsh a person for disruptive behavior m the courts' presence, for official rmsbehav10r
by a court officer, or for disobedience of a lawful order. In subsequent declSlons, the
Supreme Court has likew1se held that, despite the courts' mherent power, § 401 1mposes
bmding limits on court authority. See Bloom, 391 U.S. at 203 (§ 401 "narrowly
confined" the contempt authority); In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943) (section's prohlbition agamst both fine and 1mpnsonment IS bmding on all courts); Nye v. United
States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941) (courts' mherent contempt power IS limited to purushlng
conduct proscribed by § 401).
13
.See 107 S. Ct. 2124, 2130 (1987); 1d. at 2142 n.10 (Scalia, J., concumng). A
congressional attempt to authonze this appomtment authority would rruse Issues Identical
to the ongomg controversy over federal appomtments of mdependent counsel under the
Eth1cs m Government Act. In fact, MorriSon distingUished Young precisely on these
grounds. See mfra notes 143-57 and accompanymg text.
14 The Federal Rules of Cnmmal Procedure are promulgated by the Supreme
Court. They become Jaw unless Congress rejects them withm 90 days. 18 U.S.C. § 3771
(1982).
ts Federal Rule of Cnmmal Procedure 42 sets out the procedure for prosecution
of a cnmmal contempt. Section (a) prov1des for summary disposition of direct contempt,
and Section (b) provides for notice and heanng for mdirect contempt. Section (b) requrres
notice to take the form of a judge's oral announcement, or, "on application of the
United States attorney or of an attorney appomted by the court for that purpose," an
order to show cause. FED. R. CRIM. P 42(b) (1982) (emphasis added). See generally
Note, Pnvate Prosecutors m Cnmmal Contempt Actions Under Rule 42(b) of the Federal
Rules of Cnmmal Procedure, 54 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1141 (1986).
16
In Young, the plamtiff's counsel, at the distnct court's suggestion, had contacted
the United States Attorney's Office. The Cnmmal DiviSion Chlef, however, expressed
no mterest beyond Wishmg rum luck. Young, 107 s. Ct. at 2129. The Young majority
disapproved of thls approach, suggesting that "[judicial] restramt" suggests that a court
"ordinarily" should seek assistance from the "appropnate prosecuting authority." /d.
at 2134. At the same time, Young clearly recogruzes that a pnvate prosecutor may be
appomted if that request IS demed. Id.
12
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Judicial cnmmal contempt power IS on the surface at odds
With traditional prosecutonal discretion. The Supreme Court has
contmued to emphasize the constitutiOnal grounding of executive
discretion In law enforcement. In Umted States v Nixon, 17 the
Court msisted that the executive· branch retams "absolute discretiOn to decide whether to prosecute a case, " 18 Citing earlier
decisions tracmg prosecutonal discretiOn to "the constitutiOnal
separation of powers." 19 Indeed, In the Confiscation Cases, the
Court flatly stated that public prosecutions are "within the
excluszve direction of the distnct attorney " 20 Only evidence of
flagrant bias or discnffilnatiOn m the pattern of prosecution
seems to JUstify JUdicial review of decisions not to prosecute.21
Moreover, only those prosecuted or threatened with prosecutiOn
could file such clrums because ''in Amencan JUrisprudence at
least, a pnvate Citizen lacks a Judicially cogrnzable mterest m
the prosecution or nonprosecut10n of another. " 22
Just as pnvate litigants cannot force prosecutions to occur,
lower federal courts have also ruled that Congress has no valid
418 u.s. 683 (1974).
Id. at 693 (citing Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454 (1868)).
19
United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. demed sub. nom.
Cox v. Hauberg, 381 U.S. 935 (1965). Thus, "[i]t follows, as an mczdent to the
constitutional separation of powers, that the courts are not to mterjere with the free
exerctse of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of the United States m therr control
over cnmmal prosecutions." Id. at 171 (emphasis added); see Umted States v. Kilpatnck,
821 F.2d 1456, 1463 (lOth Cir. 1987) (a Judge may not even add by Implication an
essential element to an mdictment), cert. demed, 108 S. Ct. 699 (1988); Community for
Creative NonVIolence v. Pierce, 786 F.2d 1199, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("[t]he power to
dectde when to mvestigate, and when to prosecute, lies at the core of the Executive's
duty to see to the faithful execution of the laws").
20
Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 457 (1868) (emphasts added).
21
In general, "the conscious exerctse of some selectivity m enforcement ts not m
itself a federal constitutional VIOlation." Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962). But
JUdicial revtew Is available when a litigant shows that a prosecutor has discnmmated on
the basts of "race, relig10n, or other arbitrary classification," zd., or when a prosecutor
vmdictively exerctses hts discretion for "retaliatory use." Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S.
27. 30 (1984).
Judictal reVIew can also become available when an executive officer refuses to
perform a purely mtmstenal duty. Kendal v. United States ex ref. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12
Pet.) 524 (1838). Mimstenal duty IS defined as "one m respect to whtch nothmg ts left
to discretion." National Treasury Employees Uruon v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 607-08
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (quoting Misstsstppt v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 498 (1867)).
21
Lmda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973); see Leeke v. Timmerman,
454 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1981) (per cunam), reh'g demed, 454 U.S. 1165 (1982).
17

11
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mterest "in having laws executed properly. " 23 Unlike pnvate
litigants, Congress can mfluence enforcement discretion through
the enactment and modificatiOn of statutes. Nevertheless, some
room for executive JUdgment and discretion regarding Issues such
as the sufficiency of evidence, the availability of alternative
enforcement mechamsms, and the competmg clrums of other
cases on enforcement resources will generally remrun. 24
The Supreme Court's 1985 decision In Heckler v. Chaney25
exemplifies these concerns. Concluding that the Food and Drug
Admm1strat10n presumptively has Irreversible discretiOn to decline to challenge the safety and efficacy of particular drugs, the
Court In Chaney did not hesitate to draw the parallel between
these aspects of adm!mstrative discretiOn:
An [adnurustrative or regulatory] agency's refusal to mstitute
proceedings shares to some extent the charactenstics of the
deciSion of a prosecutor m the Executive Branch not to mdicta deciSion whtch has long been regarded as the special provmce
of the Executtve Branch, masmuch as it 1s the Executive who
Is charged by the Constitution ''to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.' ' 26

2.! Amencan Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Pierce, 697 F.2d 303, 305 (D.C. Cir.
1982); see Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 787 F.2d 815, 888 (3d
Cir. 1986) (Congress' interest m enforcmg a constitutional law 1s ''no more than that of
the average ciuzen"), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1218 (1988); Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d
21, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., dissenting), cert. granted, sub nom., Burke v. Barnes,
475 U.S. 1044 (1986), JUdgment vacated, 419 U.S. 361 (1987). The Distnct of Columbia
Circuit, however, has srud that Congress has an mterest m "the prbcess by which a bill
becomes law" and thus could sue over executive vote "nullification." Moore v. United
States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. demed, 469
U.S. 1106 (1985); see Pierce, 691 F.2d at 305. The Third Circuit, however, allows the
House or Senate to mtervene m cases where the executive either declines to defend a
statute or declares it unconstitutional. Ameron, Inc., 787 F.2d at 888 n.8. For commentary, see McGowan, Congressmen m Court: The New Plamtiffs, 15 GA. L. REv 241
(1981) (argumg for prudential doctrme of equitable discretion); Case Comment, Moore
v. House of Representatives: A Possible Expans1on of Congressmen's Standing to Sue,
60 NoTRE DAME L. REv 417 (1985) (argumg for derual of standing on constitutional
grounds).
2A One apparent exception 1s the Ethics m Government Act provJstons for the
appomtment of spec1al counselm place of Justice Department officlals. See mfra notes
143-57 and accompanymg text.
lS 470 u.s. 821 (1985).
26
Id. at 832 (citation omitted). Commentators have debated the ultimate precedential SJgnitlcance of Chaney. Compare Sunstem, Rev1ewmg Agency Inaction After
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The Court further noted that an agency generally Is ''far better
eqmpped than the courts to deal With the many variables mvolved m the proper ordermg of Its pnorities."27 Applymg this
logic to federal crunmal prosecutions, one would Imagme that
the Department of Justice IS the office m government best
eqmpped to determme which actions will best further the rule
of law
Recent Supreme Court decisions on separation of powers
also reenforce the propnety of leavmg prosecutonal discretion
matters m the executive's hands. The Court has stated that "[t]he
Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new
Federal Government mto three defined categones, Legislative,
Executive, and Judicial"28 and "this system of division and
separation of powers
was deliberately so structured to assure
full, VIgorous and open debate on the great Issues affectmg the
people and to proVIde avenues for the operation of checks on
the exercise of governmental power." 29 Plrunly, both the constitutional emphasis on tnpartite division of the federal government
and the delicate balance It creates would be senously undermmed
by arrangements blurnng the line between executive and JUdicial
powers. At the very least, the assumption of executive functions
by the JUdiciary obscures the parameters of executive discretiOn
In the Implementation of the laws,
Young runs contrary to the growmg recognitiOn of the mVIOlability of executive enforcement discretion. Young demonstrates that the JUdicial branch has an mterest, not only m
general enforcement of court orders, but also m directmg prosecution m mdiVldua/ cases. What JUstifies such an aberration
from traditional notions of prosecutonal discretlon? 30 There are

Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. Cm. L. REv. 653 (1985) (suggesting possible availability of
Implied nghts of action and other devices to secure JUdiCial review of agency maction)
with Rabkm & Devms, supra note 1, at 238-39 (Chan~y conforms to agency recognition
of propnety of executive enforcement discretion). Whatever its precedential significance,
Chaney clearly mvokes prosecutonal discretion as a shibboleth of mherent executive
prerogatives.
v Chaney, 410 U.S. at 831-32.
21 Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
29
Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3187 (1986).
:Ill Troubled by Similar concerns, some circuit court cases have questioned the
authonzation of court-appomted pnvate prosecutors under Rule 42(b) pnor to the Young

868
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two possible answers: either contempts are Innately different
from cnmes m a way that reduces separatiOn of powers concerns,
or the JUdicial branch has a umque, mherent, and overnding
need for a power of self-vmdicat10n. Each of these answers will
be exammed m tum.
II.

CONTEMPT AS CRIME

What are the attributes of a cnme? Is It the prospect of a
cnmmal penalty? Is 1t the mandate of procedural safeguards to
ensure the protectiOn of constitutiOnal nghts? Does It matter
whether the purpose of the proceeding Is to vmdicate the authonty of a branch of government rather than pumsh conduct
the legislature prescribes as harmful? Is It sigmficant that the
procedures are tnggered by noncompliance with a court order
rather than noncompliance with a legislative mandate?
The Supreme Court answered these questiOns m Young,
either directly or by mference. In the Court's view, pnor holdmgs recogmzmg "cnmmal contempt as 'a cnme m the ordinary
sense' " 31 are mconsequential to the determmation of whether
''prosecution of contempt must now be considered an execution
of the cnmmal law '' 32 In other words, cnmmal penalties and
concomitant procedural safeguards alone do not make a cnme.
Instead, the Young Court emphasized that a cnmmal contempt
Is not "conduct prescribed as harmful by the general cnmmal
laws. " 33 It IS "conduct that violates specific dut1es Imposed by

dectston. For example, the Fifth Circuit, m Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and
Engmemen v. United States, 411 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated a contempt conviction
where the prosecutor was the pnvate counsel for opposmg party m the underlymg action
on the grounds that "the National Soveretgn, through its chosen officers, should be m
control of cnmmal contempt proceedings." Id. at 319. The court remanded with the
mstruction that "the Distnct Court, if it determmes that the prosecution should go
forward, should designate the United States Attorney and hts Assistants." Id. at 320.
The court did not address what would happen if the United States Attorney declined to
prosecute. In a later case, it was argued that the Brotherhood decJston demanded that
government attorneys prosecute cnmmal contempts. A dectston was unnecessary to a
resolution of the case, however, and the court explicitly reserved the tssue. United States
v. McKenZie, 735 F.2d 907, 910 n. ll (5th Cir. 1984).
31
Young v. United States ex rei. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 107 S. Ct. 2124, 2133 (1987)
(quoting Bloom v. Illinots, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968)).
32 Id.
3 ) Id.
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the court Itself, arismg directly from the parties' participatiOn m
JUdicial proceedings" and Its "fundamental purpose [therefore]
Is to preserve respect for the JUdicial system Itself. " 34 Source,
specificity, and purpose, under this formulatiOn, are cntical
components to the deterrmnation of what constitutes a cnme.
This formulatiOn IS unsatisfactory Upon closer exammat10n,
source, specificity, and purpose seem Irrelevant to the questiOn
of whether a JUdicial prosecutmg power Is somehow mandated
by the separatiOn of powers. In addition, both the history and
modern practice of contempt proceedings make any s1gmficant
distinction from cnmmal proceedings untenable.

A. History and Contemporary Practice
Rather than rughlightmg differences, history and modern
practice generally illustrate the Identity between "general cnmes"
and mdirect cnrmnal contempt proceedings. Pnor to 1821,35
English common law treated viOlatiOns of court orders m the
same manner as normal cnmes.36 For example, Sir John Fox's
semmal work on contempt shows no distmct10n m procedures
utilized in contempt and cnmmal cases from 1253 to 1720.37

l(

Id. at 2134.

In 1821, Wilmot's optruon became an authoritative part of English law. Rex v.
Clement, I06 Eng. Rep. 918, 923 (1821); see mfra notes 38-41 and accompanymg text;
see also Bloom, 391 U.S. 194, 198 n.2 (1968).
36 See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 201-I3 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting);
Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1914) (citing Solly-Flood, 3 Transactions
of the Royal Histoncal Soctety, N.S. p. 147 (1885)); Beale, Contempt of Court, Cnmmal
and Civil, 21 HAR.v L. REv. 161, 169-70, 174 (1907-08); Frankfurter & Landis, Power
35

of Congress over Procedure m Cnmmal Contempts m "Infenor" Federal Courts-A
Study m Separation of Powers, 31 HARv L. REv. 1010, 1042-52 (1924). See generally
J. Fox, THE HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT (1927). While these authorities are
concerned with the summary nature of contempt proceedings, they nonetheless mamtam
that contempt proceedings were generally Identical to ordinary cnmmal proceedings
under the early common law.
37
See J . Fox, supra note 36, at Appendix, 227-42; Frankfurter & Landis, supra
note 36, at 1042, 1046. In Bloom v. Illin01s, 391 U.S. 194 (1968), the Supreme Court
stmply may have found no basts for summary purushment of out-of-court contempt by
a stranger to the proceedings. Id. at 198 n.2, 200. Although there IS language m Fox's
treatise to that effect, the entirety of the work suggests otherw1se. For example, on the
same page that he asserts that a contempt by a "stranger out of court was proceeded
agamst like any other trespass," he also writes that no summary proceeding for "contempts out of court" occurred before the seventeenth century. J. Fox, supra note 36,
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The turrung pomt m the difference m treatment between
cnme and contempt came wtth an erroneous and unreported
King's Bench opiruon, The King v Almon, wntten by Judge
Wilmot m 1765 38 Improperly relymg on the "immemonal usage'' of the common law, Wilmot-like the Supreme Court m
Young-spoke of the courts' mherent power to use contempt
proceedings as a means to vindicate JUdicial authority 39 Although the opiruon misstated the common law, Blackstone, a
fnend of Wilmot's, used the opmion m his Commentarres,40
where it has ''bedevilled the law of contempt both In England
and m this country ever smce.' ' 41
Amencan respect for Blackstone's Commentanes "bore this
Almon-phenomenon of England to the Uruted States, where it
was early mculcated as a rule of law " 42 By the twentieth century,
"the law of Wilmot had, like fine Wine, aged to the pmnt of
unquestlorung respect.' ' 43 Early m this century, the Supreme
Court charactenzed contempts as sm genens, not stnctly cnmmal
m nature. 44

at 4. Furthermore, after summanzmg that strangers to the proceedings were purushed
"in the ordinary course of Jaw," he notes that "parties to proceedings were governed
by the rules wruch applied to strangers." /d. at 116. Finally, hls Appendix lists cases
where resisters to the King's writ were tned m the ordinary manner. /d. at 227-42.
Frankfurter and Landis, citing Fox but adding their own research, conclude that
up to the "early part of the eighteenth century," contempts committed by persons not
"officially connected with the court" were "dealt with by the ordinary course of law,"
except where the offense occurred m the actual vtew of the court. Frankfurter & Landis,
supra note 36, at 1042. For other works reachmg the same conclusion, see also Green,
356 U.S. at 205-07 (Black, J., dissenting); Bloom, 233 U.S. at 610-11 (citing the work
of the British commentator Sally-Flood); Beale, supra note 36, 169-70.
38
Because of a procedural error, the proceeding had to be abandoned, and the
court 1ssued no op1ruon. Wilmot, who bad already written hls opiruon by thls pomt,
mcluded it m his memOirs. J. Fox, supra note 36, at 5-6. Fox critictzes the optmon as
without foundation and contrary to the common law at the time. /d. at 4, 11-15.
39
/d. at 7-8.
40
Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 36, at 1047 n.128.
41
Id. at 1047 Justice Black, m hts Green dissent, critictzed the case's "baleful
mfluence on the law of contempt both m thts country and m England." Green, 356
U.S. at 203 (Black, J., dissenting).
41
R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 19 (1963).
•3 Id•
.. Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95, 103 (1924); Gompers v. Bucks Stove &
Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911); Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 326
(1904).
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Remarkably, smce the Judiciary Act of 1789 and until the
Young opm10n, the Supreme Court and Congress have Increasmgly returned to the ongmal common law moonngs by msistmg
that cnmmal contempt be treated like other cnmes.45 While the
Court has never ruled that mdirect contempt IS mdistmgmshable
from other cnmes, this shift In emphasis bespeaks the fundamental Identity between contempt and "general cnmes."
Numerous Court decisions have equated contempts with general cnmes. 46 As stated by Justice Holmes:
,

These contempts are mfractions of the law, visited with punIshment as such. If such acts are not cnmmal, we are m error
as to the most fundamental charactenstic of cnmes as that
word has been understood m English speech.47

In fact, m Bloom v 11/inozs, the Court concluded that "the role
of cnmmal contempt and that of many ordinary cnmmal laws
seem Identical-protection of the mstltutions of our government
and enforcement of their mandates. " 48 Finally, several Supreme
Court rulings recogruze the especially strong need to provide
procedural protections m contempt actions because contempt

~'

With respect to Congress, after dissatisfaction with JUdictal abuse under the

1789 Judictary Act's unrestncted grant of contempt power, Congress restncted the

contempt powers to "nusbehav10r 10 the presence of the court or so near thereto as to
obstruct JUStice; mtsbehav10r of court officers m thetr offictal transactions; and disobedience of or reststance to the lawful writ, process, order, or decree of the court." Bloom,
391 U.S. at 202-03; see Green, 356 U.S. at 168-72.
46
See Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2133 (" '[c]nnunal contempt 1s a cnme m the ordinary
sense' ")(quoting Bloom, 391 U.S. at 201); Michaelson v. United States ex rei. Chtcago,
St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924) ("[t]he fundamental charactenstics of both
[cnmes and cnmmal contempts] are the same"); O'Neal v. United States, 190 U.S. 36,
38 (1903) (an adjudication for contempt IS "in effect a Judgment m a cnnunal case");
New Orleans v. The Steamshtp Co., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 387, 392 (1874) ("[c]ontempt of
court 1s a specific cnnunal offense") .
•, Gompers, 233 U.S. at 610; see also Green, 356 U.S. at 201 (Black, J ., dissenting}:
As it may now be purushed cnnunal contempt ts manifestly a cnme by
every relevant test of reason or htstory.
It possesses all the earmarks
commonly attributed to a cnme. A mandate of the Government has allegedly been v10lated for whtch severe purushment, mcluding long pnson
sentences, may be exacted-purushment rumed at chastismg the v1olator
for hts disobedience.
•• Bloom, 391 U.S. at 201.
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"strikes at the most vulnerable and human qualities of a JUdge's
temperament.' ' 49
Over the course of this century, the Supreme Court has srud
that cnmmal contempt IS an "offense" for statute of limitatiOns
purposes50 and the Constitution's pardon clause;51 that due process reqmres a reasonable doubt standard and the self-mcnmination pnvilege; 52 that accused contemners be given pnor notice,
a heanng, defense counsel, and the opporturuty to present witnesses;53 that courts adhere to the normal rules of evidence;54
that the accused contemnor has a nght to a public tnal before
an Impartial Judge55 and to confront and cross-examine witnesses;56 and that the accused contemnor has a nght to a JUry
tnal.57 Today, aside from the appomtments power recogruzed In
Young, cnmmal proceedings differ from mdirect cnminal contempt only m the need for grand JUry mdictments.58 Indeed, the

Id. at 202; see Sacher v. Umted States, 343 U.S. 1, 12 (1952) (contempt 1s an
offense agrunst a JUdge's "dignity and authority"), relz 'g demed, 343 U.S. 931 (1952);
Locke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925) (contempt may mvolve personal attack
on JUdge); Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 313 (1888) (a contemnor msults a court's
"dignity").
50
Gompers, 233 U.S. at 610-13.
1
'
Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 89 (1925).
2
'
Gompers, 221 U.S. at 418.
3
'
Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
$4 See generally Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 385 (1957), reh'g demed, 353
u.s. 931 (1957).
'' Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954).
6
'
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
" Bloom, 391 U.S. at 202.
' 8 United States v. Nunn, 622 F.2d 802, 804 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Bukowsla, 435 F.2d 1094, 1099-1102 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. demed, 401 U.S. 911 (1971).
See Kuhns, Lrmiting the Cnmmal Contempt Power: New Roles for the Prosecutor and
the Grand Jury, 73 MICH. L. REv 483, 492-93 (1974-75) (advocating that contempts be
treated like cnmes m all respects). Because federal grand Junes are techmcally a part of
the executive branch, the failure to convene a grand JUry JS cons1stent with court-Initiated
contempt proceedings. For a recent discussiOn of federal grand JUnes, see Note, The
Attorney-Client Pnvilege m Congresswnal Investigations, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 145 (1988).
Two other mmor differences anse between cnmes and contempts. First, while
VIolation of an mvalid statute IS not pumshable under cnmmallaw, VIolation of a court
order Is cmmnal contempt regardless of the order's ·validity. Maness v. Meyers, 419
U.S. 449, 458-59 (1975). Th1s procedural difference, however, hardly JUStifies a JUdicial
contempt appomtment power. Because it affords court orders even more respect and
efficacy under the law than the status that statutes enJOY, tt actually reduces the need
for JUdicial self-enforcement. It thus makes a contempt appomtment power even less
49
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Court m Young construed the contemporary practice to be to
treat cnmmal contempt like other cnmes.59 Young, however,
finds support for the JUdicial appomtments power. It pomts to
the uruque source, specificity, and purpose of mdirect contempt,
which distingmsh contempt from "general cnmes." 60 Young also
speaks of the essentially passive nature of JUdicial proceedings,
which makes the contempt power "necessary" to the JUdiciary's
ability to function as a coequal branch. 61 We shall first consider
source, specificity, and purpose.

B. Source, Specificzty, and Purpose
SOURCE: It IS hard to fathom why the Young Court finds
significant the fact that mdirect cnminal contempt Is tnggered
by refusal to comply with a court order, rather than by legislatively enacted cnmmal law 62 Because both types of malfeasance
are subJect to cnmmal penalty, no Intmtlve reason eXIsts to clrum
that a violatiOn of the cnmmal law IS a cnme whereas nonacqmesence to a valid court order IS a noncnme subject to cnmmal
penalty In both cases, the court IS pumshmg cnmmally a breach
of socially acceptable conduct. Common sense suggests that the
pumshability of the breach defines the cnme, not the source of
the norm that IS subject to pumshment upon violatiOn. Undoubtedly, one would be hard pressed to explrun to the cnmmal
contemnor awrutmg sentencmg that his conduct was noncnmmal.63

compelling.
Second, JUdges have plenary discretion regarding dismissal of contempt prosecutions: a federal JUdge may dismiss an otherwise valid contempt prosecution if she finds
m her discretion that no public mterest would be served by continuation of the proceedmg. United States v. Barnett, 346 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1965). This power, of course, IS
merely the other side of the Young power to Initiate mdirect contempt prosecutions.
Our critique of Young IS therefore applicable to thts practice.
59 Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2133 ("Our InSistence on the cnmmal character of contempt
prosecutions has been mtended to rebut early charactenzations of such actions as
undeserv:mg of the protections normally provtded :m cnmmal proceedings.").
60
/d. at 2133-34; see mfra notes 62-72 and accompanymg text.
61 Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2131-34; see mfra notes 73-79 and accompanymg text.
61
Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2133 (distingmshmg contempt from "conduct proscribed
as harmful by the general cnmmal laws").
63 This IS especially true m Young, where one of the contemners received a five
year "nonsentence." /d. at 2128 n.l.
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The source argument also falters because contempts are VIolatiOns of the general cnmmallaw. 18 U.S.C. sectiOn 401 makes
"[d]isobedience or resistance to . . [a court's] lawful writ,
process, order, rule, decree, or command" purushable by fine
or Impnsonment. 64 Although sectiOn 401 can be charactenzed as
merely codification of an 1nherent JUdicial power, 65 It Is nonetheless a congressiOnal statute applicable to allmdiVIduals withm
the JUrisdictiOn of the United States. Indeed, m Eloom v 1/linors, 66 the Supreme Court charactenzed. this provision as "the
basis for the general power to pumsh cnmmal contempt. " 67
SPECIFICITY The Young Court's emphasis on the fact
that-unlike other cnmmals-the cnmmal contemnor Hviolates
specific duties Imposed by the court Itself' ' 68 can mean one of
two things, neither of whxch JUstifies the conclusiOn that cnmmal
contempt xs not a cnme. First, the Court might vtew a court
order as distmct from a law of general applicability because it
only binds the participants tn a JUdicial proceeding. With respect
to those participants, however, the court order xs as much a
legal mandate as any legislative provxs10n. Furthermore, legislative enactments do not truly apply to all; anti-pollution measures
only affect those who might pollute, and the restrrunt of trade
prohibition only affects those who might restrrun trade. Contempt as a consequence of noncompliance with a court order
therefore seems as much a rule of general applicability as the
penalties associated with viOlations of environmental or antitrust
laws.
Second, the Court might consider cnmmal contempt as an
mtemal bookkeepmg measure thereby not Implicating the broader
concerns of legislatively enacted cnmmal law In fact, Young
places sigmficant weight on the fact that a "parties' participation
In JUdicial proceedings" IS a prereqUisite to an Indirect contempt
prosecutiOn.69 Th1s distmct10n IS unsatisfactory It restates the
"source" argument, z.e., cnmmal contempt Is not a cnme be-

64

65
66

61
68
69

18 u.s.c. § 401 (1982).
See supra note 9 and accompanymg text.
391 u.s. 194 (1968).
Id. at 203-04.
Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2134,

Id.
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cause cnmes are a legislative statement of social mores. In other
words, even If one views Indirect contempt as essentially an
mternal matter, the availability of a cnminal penalty necessarily
means that contempt-like other ctimes-Is a breach of socially
acceptable conduct.
Specificity concerns, moreover, extend beyond JUdicial action. For example; admimstrative agencies make determmat10ns
JUSt as specific as court orders, bmding on specific parties, and
yet the agencies have no power to mstitute cnminal prosecutions
for violations of their rulings. Young surely does not mtimate
that they should be able to do so,70 rather than refer such
violations to the Umted States Attorney as they now do?
PURPOSE: Young also distinguishes mdirect contempt from
''the general cnmmal laws'' because contempt prosecutions ''serve
the limited purpose of vmdicatmg the authonty of the court.' ' 71
Yet, do not VIolations of "general" laws challenge the authonty
of the legislature? How then can one distmgmsh between general
law prosecutiOns from limited contempt prosecutions? It seems
farMfetched to argue that the obJect of the contemnor's offense
IS court authority (rather than the court order she seeks to evade)
whereas the obJect of the "general" law VIolator IS the substantive law (rather than the legislative body which enacts it). 72
Considermg the Implausibility of this argument, this rationale
seems little more than a naked statement that the JUdiciary IS
mstitutiOnally less able to withstand noncompliance than the
other branches of government. Even if this necessity argument
IS true, however, it speaks only to JUdicial authonty In contempt
actions. It does not suggest that mdirect contempt IS not a cnme.
The notion that, m light of this purpose, contempt Is mherently different from other cnmes IS troubling on another count.
Under this formulatiOn, all laws seem fundamentally different
from each other for they all concern different areas and serve
different purposes. Contempt concerns JUdicial authonty JUSt as
the Ethics m Government Act concerns executive branch corrup-

70

See R.

GOLDFARB,

supra note 42 at 128-61 (argumg that such a power should

eXIst).

Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2133 (emphasis added).
The Bloom Court makes precisely this pomt. See supra note 48 and accompanymg text.
71

71
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tion. Yet Young certru:nly does not counsel that the executive's
special Interest m mternal corruptiOn JUStifies plenary executive
control of Ethics m Government Act enforcement. It therefore
seems Incomprehensible that a law's purpose should serve as the
mitial reference pomt for gaugmg the applicability of traditional
cnrmnal enforcement.

*********
The failure of source, specificity, and purpose to JUStify
distmct treatment for contempt leaves only the "necessity" ratiOnale. We shall now turn our attention to this JUStificatiOn.
Ill.

THE NECESSITY RATIONALE

The Young Court also grounded Its opimon In necessity The
Court warns that, without the contempt appomtment power, the
JUdiciary would be dependent on the executive to vindicate Its
authonty, thereby rendenng the courts "mere boards of arbitratiOn whose Judgments and decrees would be only advisory ''73
Young further supports this assumption of "quasi-executive"
power by highlighting the passivity of the JUdicial function.
Unlike the other ·branches of government whose JUrisdictiOn
''would mclude the entire populatiOn,' ' 74 a JUdicial contempt
authonty extends "only" over those whose obligatiOns spnng
from an earlier court proceeding.75 Consequently, rather than
extending the JUdiciary mto the executive sphere, the contempt
power merely prevents the transformatiOn of the JUdicial power
mto a ''mere mockery ''76
Justice Scalia took Issue with this reasomng, argumg that
the JUdicial power IS limited to "the power to decide, In accordance with law, who should prevail In a case or controversy " 77
Furthermore, clru:mmg that the separatiOn of powers presupposes
that each branch Is somewhat dependent on other branches to
put mto effect their JUdgments,78 Justice Scalia accuses the rna-

Young v. United States ex ref. Vuitton Et Fils S.A., 107 S. Ct. 2124, 2132
(1987) (quoting Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 4I8, 450 (1911)).
74
Jd. at 2134 n.lO.
73

" Jd.
76
Jd. at 2131 (quoting Gompers, 221 U.S. at 450).
77
Jd. at 2142 (Scalia, J., concurrmg).
" Jd. at 2143.
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JOnty of validatmg a tyranmcal regime m which JUdges make
the laws, prosecute their viOlatiOn, and sit In Judgment of their
prosecutiOn [sic].79
In our VIew, Justice Scalia makes the better argument. Our
system of checks and balances presupposes Interdependence. This
seems especially true In the case of the JUdiciary, ''the least
dangerous branch." Consequently, unless mst1tut10nal necessity
mandates some deviation from executive prosecutonal discretion,
the executive should bnng forward cnminal contempt cases. A
review of the law of congressiOnal contempt and an assessment
of mdirect cnminal contempt's Impact on core JUdicial functiOns
convmces us that Young's "necessity" ratiOnale IS without ment.
This sectiOn shall detail our reasomng on this matter.

A. Judiczal Independence and the Separation of Powers
The dependence on one branch to carry out the will of
another IS fundamental to the separatiOn of powers. From PresIdent Jackson's Infamous response to McCulloch v Mary/ancf8°
{"John Marshall has made his decision, let him enforce It")81 to
Justice Jackson's astute recognitiOn m Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v Sawyer that "[w]hile Congress cannot depnve the
President of the command of the army and navy, only Congress
can provide him an army or navy to command"82 to the current
controversy over the mdependent counsel,83 It Is axiOmatic that
each branch plays a cntical role m the other branches' effectiveness. Congress depends on the executive to enforce the laws,
and the JUdiciary and the executive both depend on Congress to
support therr operations. The JUdiciary also depends on Congress
and the executive to pass legislation and undertake enforcement
mecharusms that will make Its decisions mearungful. 84 Even withm

Id. at 2145.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
11
The phrase IS reputed. See J. AGRESTO, THE SUPREME CoURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 90 (1984).
12
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 644 (1952) (Jackson,
J ., concumng).
13 Mornson v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
"' School desegregation IS a pnme example. The Supreme Court's mandate m
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was little more than a false promtse
79

80
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the area of contempt, JUdges depend on executive officials to
arrest and Jail conv1cted contemnors. No pnnciple of necessity
gives Congress the power to prosecute and Jail law VIolators if
the executive fails to do so or g~ves the executive the authonty
to support itself when Congress fails to appropnate funds.
Recogruzmg the sanctity of separatiOn of powers, the Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that no branch may exercise
a functiOn reserved to a coordinate branch. Executive efforts to
exercise lawmaking functions were declared Invalid In
Youngstown85 as were executive efforts to control the Judiciary's
adjudicatory power In Umted States v Nixon 86 and Northern
Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Lme Co. 87 CongressiOnal efforts
to exercise executive/admmistrative functiOns have been rejected
In Buckley v Valeo, 88 Immzgration and Naturalization Servzce
v. Chadha, 89 and Bowsher v Synar 90 Finally, m Umted States
v Brown,91 the Court ruled that the Bill of Attamder Clause
was mtended as a "safeguard agamst legislative exercise of the
JUdicial function.' ' 92 All of these cases speak to the same proposition, namely, ''that mdividual freedoms will best be preserved

until Congress and the executive took steps to desegregate public schools. In fact, with
·the advent of executive and legislative programs, more actual desegregation of southern
schools occurred m 1965 than m the decade followmg Brown. See DeVJns & Stedman,

New Federalism m Education: The Meanmg of the Chzcago School Desegregation Cases,
59 NoTRE DAME L. REv 1243, 1246-51 (1984); Kirp, School Desegregation and the
Lzmits of Legalism, 41 PUB. INTEREST 101 (Sprmg 1977); see also T. BECKER & M.
FEELY, THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 69-76 (1973) (discussing delays m the
enforcement of school desegregation deciSIOns).
u Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 579 (executive may not exerc1se article I lawmakmg
powers granted to Congress).
86
418 U.S. 683 (I974) (executive may not exercise article III adjudicatory power
granted to JUdiciary).
17
Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Lme Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (executive
appomtment of bankruptcy JUdges violates article III adjudicatory power).
81 424 U.S. 1, 125 (1976) (per cunam) (Congress may not retam power to remove
officials exerc1smg executive authority).
19
462 U.S. 919 (1983) (Congress may not utilize smgle-house veto to control
admm1strative agenc1es).
90 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986) (executive powers cannot be entrusted to offic1als who
can be removed by Congress).
91

381

u.s. 437 (1965).

Id. at 442; see United States v. Klem, 80 U.S. (13 WallJ 128 (1871) (Congress
Improperly exerc1ses executive authority when it mterferes with agency rulemakmg).
n

1987-88]

CONTEMPT PROSECUTORS

879

through a separation of powers and division of functiOns among
the different branches and levels of government. " 93
In the case of the JUdiciary, the necessity of prohibitmg
courts from assummg the responsibilities of the other branches
becomes especially clear. In The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton
has set forth the classic statement on the limits of JUdicial power·
The JUdiciary
has no mfluence over either the sword or
the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth
of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever. It
may truly be srud to have neither FORCE nor WILL but
merely JUdgment; and must ultimately depend upon the rud of
the executive arm even for the efficacy of its JUdgments. 94

Ascribmg to this VIew of the JUdiciary as ''the weakest of the
three departments of power"95 makes life tenure for JUdges
acceptable. The courts are given the power of JUdicial review
completely msulated from outside mfluence precisely because
their opimons are only as valid as they are persuasive. Indeed,
for Hamilton, "there IS no liberty If the power of JUdgmg be
not separated from the legislative and executive powers. " 96
All of this IS not to say that the JUdiciary IS absolutely
forbidden from performmg nonJudicial acts. As the Supreme
Court has recogmzed, the separatiOn of powers does not reqmre
"a hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government
from one another, " 97 but JUdicial encroachment mto the executive sphere must be JUStified by true "necessity " In other words,
the rhetonc of Young-that Without the power to Imtiate mdirect
cnmmal contempt, the JUdiciary will be a "mere mockery"must be close to correct. We shall now explore the veracity of
the Young argument.
B. Direct Versus Indirect Contempt: Towards an Understanding
of Essential Judicza/ Functions
The Young Court, pomtmg to a long line of precedents, held
that the contempt power speaks both to the disruptiOn of court
93

United States v. United States Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Michigan, 407

u.s. 297, 317 (1972).

9" THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 522-23 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
" Id. at 465-66.
96
Id. at 466.
97
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 121.
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proceedings and the enforcement of court orders. 98 Consequently, Young VIews the distmct10n between In-court and outof-court contempts as pertment only to procedural matters, rather
than mherent JUdicial authonty 99 Justice Scalia takes Issue With
this depiction of pnor Court decisions. In his vtew, the most
recent of these pnor precedents-Bloom v Jllinors100-"specifically rejected [earlier decisiOns'] ratiOnale that courts must have
self-contamed power to pumsh disobedience of their Judgments.'' 101
We need not resolve whether Justice Scalia or the Young
rnaJonty Is the better reader of precedent. In our view, Indirect
cnminal contempts cannot be supported by a "necessity" ratiOnale and therefore are violative of the separatiOn of powers
scheme. 102
Young's necessity argument IS of two parts, namely· (1)
without mdirect cnmmal contempt, " 'a party can make himself
a JUdge of the validity of orders whtch have been Issued' " 103
and (2) mtrus10n mto the other branches spheres of authority IS
de rrnmmis because the cnminal contempt power Is Iirrnted to
those whose legal obligat10ns result from pnor court proceedmgs.104 Neither of these arguments adequately supports Indirect
cnmmal contempt.
The first argument, necessity, appears mcorrect on at least
two counts. The use of cnmmal sanctions to deter future viOlYoung, 101 S. Ct. at 2132 (citing Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324,
333 (1904); Ex Parte Robtnson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1874); Anderson v. Dunn,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821)).
99
Young, 101 S. Ct. at 2132-33.
100
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
101 Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2145 (Scalia, J., concurnng).
102
See also Cohen, Self-love and the Judicwl Power to Appomt a Speczal Prosecutor, I6 HoFSTRA L. REv 23 (1987) (crittcizmg necessity rationale m Young).
103
Young, 101 S. Ct. at 2I32 n.8 (citing Gompers, 221 U.S. at 450). In a May
1988 decision, the Supreme Court clarified thts necessity holding. United States v.
Providence Journal Co., 108 S. Ct. 1502 (1988). Upholding the Solicitor General's power
to authonze all certioran filings by the United States, the Provzdence Journal Court
dismtssed a writ of certioran filed by a court-appomted prosecutor. In distingmshtng
Young, the Court clrumed that the executive's plenary authority m thts area does not
Implicate necessity concerns. Id. at 1507-IO. Since a court-appomted prosecutor can only
seek certiorari if her contempt prosecution has already failed, the Court reasoned that
"the necessity that requtred the appomtment of an mdependent prosecutor has faded
and, mdeed, ts no longer present." !d. at 1508.
104
!d. at 2134 n.IO.
98
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at10ns of court orders seems an executive functiOn. The JUdicial
role IS the resolutiOn of cases or controversies. Consequently, It
appears that the JUdiciary need only the authority to pumsh
direct contempts or at most an additional coercive civil contempt
power for out-of-court obstructions of JUdicial proceedings. The
logic underlymg the doctrme of absolute JUdicial Immumty for
the violation of constitutional nghts supports this reasomng. 105
Judicial Immunity spnngs from the notion that pnncipled and
fearless deciSionmakmg IS a prereqUisite to the effective exercise
of the JUdicial functiOn. This concern of the JUdicial functiOn,
however, IS with the nght to decide a case, not With the nghtness
or wrongness of the decision. Concern over compliance With a
court order, In our view, speaks more to the correctness of a
decision than to the decisionmaking process and IS therefore not
an Integral element of the JUdicial functiOn.
The "necessity" argument has another fault. Necessity presupposes that cnmmal contempt IS the only mechamsm that will
mstill needed respect m the JUdiciary. Civil contempt, however,
can be qmte effective. 106 For example, the Umted States Catholic
Conference was recently subject to a civil contempt penalty of
over $100,000 per day for Its failure to comply with a discovery
order. 107 Young neither can nor does address this Issue.
Young's second argument, scope, IS also unsupportable. The
contempt power Is not always lirmted to the parties before the
court. 108 Moreover, parties do not necessarily "assume the nsk"
s See generally Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), reh•g demed, 436 U.S.
951 {1978); Block, Stump v. Sparkman and the History of JudiciO/ Immunity, 1980
DUKE L.J. 879; Note, Liability of Judicial Offices Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J.
322 (1969).
106
While it IS of course true that the executive enforces CIVil as well as cnmmal
law, separation of powers concerns are less acute here. Civil contempt proceedings are
constdered a part of the ongmal cause of action whereas cnmmal contempt 1s a collateral
proceeding "between the public and the defendant." Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range
Co., 221 U.S. 418, 445 (1911).
107
See Bnef for Petitioners, United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights
Mobilization, Inc., at 8 (argumg, m part, that a court without article III power cannot
Issue a subpoena or coerce compliance through c1vil contempt). The Supreme Courtaccepting the petitioners' argument-recently overturned this award. United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, 108 S. Ct. 2268 (1988).
101
See, e.g., Seymour v. United States, 373 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967) (affirmmg the
contempt conviction of a teleVIsion news photographer who took photographs m the
hallway outside a courtroom m viOlation of a standing order). Admittedly, the obJection
here 1s more analytical than practical because cases of thts type are not very common.
10
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by coming before the court voluntarily. Because anyone can be
sued, the "parties potentially subject toH 109 the court's contempt
authority do, In fact, "include the entire population. " 11° For
this very reason, Young's attempt to distmgmsh a JUdicial contempt power from a congressional enforcement power IS
stramed. 111
A host of pragmatic reasons also supports rejection of
Young's "necessity" "nonmttusiVeness" rationale. The mdirect
cnmmal contempt power that Young gives the JUdiciary IS far
from harmless. From a functional perspective, the cnmmal contempt power presents a very real problem of Institutional b1as. 112
Judges are more likely to perceive msults to their authonty than
are Umted States Attorneys, and therefore are more likely to
Imtiate proceedings In borderline cases. Indeed, the anticipated
standards for prosecution must be lower for a JUdge than for a
prosecutor because Young envisions cases where a judge will go
forward after a prosecutor has declined. 113 Thus, an umntended
consequence of Young may be the establishment of a dual cnmmal JUStice system-one for VIolators of the "general" law en..
forced by the United States Attorney, the other-possibly utilizmg
a lower threshold for actionable wrongdomg-for violators of
court orders enforced by the JUdiciary
109

Young, 107

110

/d.

s. Ct. at 2134 n.lO.

See supra notes 68-70 ahd accompanymg text.
See generally Komesar, Back to the Future-An /hStitutional View of Makmg
and Interpreting Constitutions, 81 Nw U.L. REv 191 (1987) (advocating a "comparative
mstitutional" approach to separation of powers, wherem the resources, abilities, and
biases of each branch are considered when assigrung powers and functions among the
branches).
113
The D.C. Circuit rrused such fundamental concerns m In re Sealed Case, 838
F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nom., Mornson v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
In mvalidating the special counsel law, the court suggested that a lower standard for
prosecution eXIsted for subJects of an mdependent counsel investigation, and thus "fundamental frurness" problems might arise. /d. at 510. In reversmg this deciston, the
Supreme Court did not comment on thts concern.
Functional concerns did play a part m Morrzson, however. In defense of the special
counsel provision, the Court argued that JUdges are "especially well qualified" to appomt
prosecutors. Morrzson, 108 S. Ct. at 2611 n.13 (1988). This proposition ts troublesome.
Although the Court was merely contrasting the JUdiciary's qualifications m appomting
legal counsel with the qualifications of non-legal offictals, the Court was more accurate
m its 1985 recognition that enforcement decistons are ''peculiarly within [the) expertise"
of the executive. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
111

112
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As the ''inJured party,'' moreover, a JUdge IS precisely the
worst person to make the decision to prosecute, because she IS
an mterested participant. Indeed, m Bloom v, Illinors, the Court
recogmzed the Hpotential for abu&e"H 4 m summary contempt
because "[m]en who make their way to the bench sometimes
exhibit vanity, Irascibility, narrowness, arrogClllce, and other
weaknesses to which human flesh IS heir. " 115
These dangers are heightened under the eXIstmg f~deral rules,
because In cnmmal contempt cases not mvolvmg '~disrespect to
or criticism of a JUdge," the presiding Judge makes the complamt, decides whether to prosecute, appomts the prosecutor,
presides over the tnal, and, upon conviction, sentences the defendant.116 Justrce Scalia therefore rrused no Idle concern when
he complruned m Young of "judges' [src] m effect making the
laws, prosecutmg their violation, and s1ttmg m JUdgm~nt of those
prosecutions. "117
Aside from the Inherent btas of the courts, executive offiCials' mnate expenence with prosecutonal discretion makes assignment of thts duty to article II officials desrrable from a
functiOnal perspective. Enforcement deciSions reqwre the weigh..
mg of a large number of factors, mcluding the sufficiency of
evidence, the availability of alternatives, the allocatiOn of scarce
resources, and others. The consideratiOn of these factors by the
executive IS "peculiarly withm Its expertise," and thus the executive ''is far better eqmpped than the courts to deal with the
many variables Involved. " 118
On the most practical level, the appOintment power IS simply
not necessary to protect the JUdiciary from Impotence. Courts
In civil law countnes do not enJOY such a power, but they
nonetheless mruntrun their efficacy 119 The Supreme Court has
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 202 (1968).
ld. at 202, n.4 (quoting Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 12 (1952)).
116
Rule 42(b) provides for disqualification of the "inJured" JUdge from presiding
at the contempt tnal only when the "contempt charged mvolves disrespect to or criticism
of a JUdge. " Federal courts have held that the same JUdge whose order was disobeyed
can sentence the contemnor. United States v. Prugh, 479 F.2d 611 (8th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Conole, 365 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. demed, 385 U.S. 1025 (1967).
But see United States v. Combs, 390 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1968).
117 Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2145 (Scalia, J., concurrmg).
111
Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831-32.
119 R. GoLDFARB, supra note 42, at 22.
n•

115
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used Its contempt power only once, 120 and yet It IS by no means
a "mere board of arbitratiOn. " 121
Courts can depend on the executive to enforce contempt
JUdgments, JUSt as they already depend on the executive to
enforce liens and Impnson mdividuals whom the courts adjudicated as cnmmals. As noted earlier, even m the contempt context, courts trust the executive to arrest and pumsh those Judged
to be m contempt. 122
Prosecutors simply will not refuse JUdges' requests to prosecute contemners. A study of federal prosecutors on this subJect
showed that they umformly Imtiate proceedings agrunst recalcitrant witnesses. 123 One federal distnct has adopted a policy of
mitiatmg cnmmal contempts by mdictment. Prosecutors there
have not refused JUdges' requests to seek contempt Indictments.
The Chief Judge considered such a refusal unlikely m light of
the close workmg relatiOnship between the court and the prosecutors.124 Indeed, given attorneys' natural eagerness to keep
themselves m the Judge's good graces, any refusal of a valid
request seems unlikely, and refusals on a level sufficient to
undermme respect for the JUdiciary seem wildly Improbable.
The maJOrity m Young acknowledged this:
In practice, courts can reasonably expect that the public prosecutor will accept the responsibility for prosecutiOn. Indeed,
the Umted States Attorney's Manual § 9-39 -318 (1984) expressly provides: ''In the great maJOrity of cases the dedication
of the executive branch to the preservation of respect for
JUdicial authority makes the acceptance by the U.S. Attorney
of the court's request to prosecute a mere formality
" 12S

The ma]onty used the likelihood of executive compliance to
rnimffilze the effect of Its decision. Analytically, that likelihood
undercuts the ratiOnale for the deciSion. There IS simply no
reason to disrupt the separation of powers when the executive IS
likely to pursue Indirect contempt violatiOns.

120
121
122

123
12A
125

United States v. Sh1pp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906).
Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2132 (quoting Gompers, 221 U.S. at 450).
Id. at 2143 (Scalia, J., concurnng).
Kuhns, supra note 58, at 512-13 & n.134.
Id. at 503 n.98.
Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2134.
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These pragmatic concerns, combined With the unpersuasiveness of Young's "necessity" and "scope" rationales, convmce
us that mdirect cnmmal contempt Is not essential to the Integnty
of the JUdicial system. Consequently, this deviation from separatiOn of powers IS unsupportable.
C.

Lessons from Other Places
1.

Contempt of Congress

Contempt of Congress' actwns 126 buttress our conclusion that
mdirect contempt prosecutions are not an essential JUdicial attribute. In fact, while "necessity" does not JUStify mherent
congressiOnal power to pumsh cnrmnal contempt, the "necessity'' argument here IS much stronger than the necessity argument accepted by Young for mdirect cnrmnal contempt.
Congress has no mherent power to pumsh for cnm1nal contempt. 127 In contrast to Bntam, where legislative contempt IS
Immune from Judicial review, 128 Congress has mherent power
only to "coerce" by civil contempt. This power Is mherent
because without It Congress could not effectively undertake Its
legislative rmssion but mstead would be left "exposed to every
mdigmty and InterruptiOn, that rudeness, capnce, or even conspuacy, may mediate agamst it." 129 Dissatisfied with the narrow
scope of Its mherent power, Congress enacted legislatiOn m 1857
providing for cnmmal contempt. 130 In In re Chapman, 131 the
Court validated this proviSion as "an act necessary and proper
for carrymg mto execution the powers vested m Congress and

See generally United States v. Fort, 443 F.2d 670, 676-78 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
demed, 403 U.S. 932 (1971); L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS
AND THE PRESIDENT 184-220 (1985); Moreland, Congresswnal Investigations and Pnvate
Persons, 40 S. CAL. L. REv 189 (1967).
127
The Constitution does explicitly vest Congress with a number of JUdicial powers,
mcluding the power to purush members. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190
(1880).
111
L. FISHER, supra note 126, at 187.
129
Anderson, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 228.
n o Act of January 24, 1857, ch. 19, 11 Stat. 155 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.
§ 192 (1982)).
Ill 166 u.s. 661 (1897).
126
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In each House thereof." 132 Critical to tlus holding was the Court's
recogmt10n that the obJect of contempt prosecutions was the
"disclosure of evidence" essential to Congress' legislative functiOn.I33 Congress' contempt power thus ruds Its mvestigative function, which Is central to Its constitutional role.
Cnmmal contempt of Congress IS different from mdirect
cnmmal contempt m two cntlcal respects. First, congressional
contempt IS undertaken pursuant to a "general" law because
the legislature's Inherent contempt power extends only to coercion, not pumshment. Unlike mdirect cnmmal contempt, contempt of Congress reenforces the maxim that the legislature
specifies that which IS cnmmal. Second, congressiOnal contempt
speaks only to conduct that directly Impedes the legislative functiOn. Unlike Indirect cnmmal contempt, this requirement ensures
that the contempt mechamsm IS narrowly tailored to essential
legislative functtons.
Procedures governmg the filing of a congressiOnal contempt
action are also mstructive. Under 2 U .S.C. sectiOn 194, the
House Speaker or Senate Prestdent shall certtfy facts constituting
a contempt of Congress "to the appropnate U.S. attorney,
whose duty 1t shall be to bnng the matter before the grand JUry
for Its act10n." 134 Because "shall" does not necessarily mean
"must, " 135 tt Is possible that the statute preserves prosecutonal
discretion. 136 In fact, the Reagan admimstrat10n adopted this
view In Its handling of contempt of Congress charges agrunst
EPA AdmiiDstrator Anne Gorsuch. 137
Even If sectiOn 194 mandates executive actiOn, 138 the mtrus10n
on executive prerogatives may be m1mmal m practice. The pros-

132

m

/d. at 671.
Jd. (quoting Chapman v. United States, 5 App. D.C. 122, 130-31 (D.C. Cir.

1895)).
134

m

2 U.S.C. § 194 (1982) (emphasis added).
See generally Sutton, Use of "Shall" m Statutes, 4 JoHN

MARsHALL

L.Q. 204

(1938).
136
But cj. Ex parte Frankfeld, 32 F Supp. 915, 916 (D.D.C. 1940) (U.S. Attorney
has no discretion with contempts of Congress but must -submit the facts to the grand

JUry).

See I29 Cong. Rec. H6441-47 (1983); L. FISHER, supra note 126, at 211-12.
In our view, because the executive retams complete discretion over the manner m which it should bnng a contempt of Congress case, any obligation to present the case
before the grand JUry 1s no more than a "mmtstenal" task.
"

137

138
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ecutor would still retrun discretion to handle the case In a manner
she deemed appropnate.I 39 This ''safety valve'' Is unavailable In
Young, where executive prosecutonal discretiOn may be turned
over to a JUdicial appomtee.I40 Moreover, legislative trutiation
may well be consistent with the separation of powers. Because
the cnmmal contempt power appears a necessary corollary to
the mvestigative functioni 4 I and because the executive retruns
discretion m handling the case, neither of the two pnncipal
mfirmities of Young prosecutiOns are present. In addition, the
failure of· the executive to mitiate contempt proceedings IS a
more realistic concern wrth congressional contempt than with
the violation of court orders because resistance to congressional
subpoenas may come from admimstration officials.I 42
The analogy between congressional contempt and directed
cnmmal contempt cuts agrunst the Young decisiOn. CongressiOnal contempt may well preserve prosecufonal discretiOn. CongressiOnal contempt, moreover, IS a narrowly tailored means of
protecting Congress' Investigative function.
2. Independent Counsel

Another, more obviOus analogy IS the Ethics m Government
Act provisions allowmg for the court appomtment of mdependent counsels by "Special DivisiOn" panels. 143 While senous sep-

R. GOLDFARB, supra note 42, at 42.
In fact, court control over both the appomtment of the prosecutor and the
sentencmg of the contemnor make it likely that the court-appomted prosecutor will do
little else than help put mto effect the appomting court's preference.
141
This, of course, IS the critical question. On the one hand, cnmmal contempt of
Congress enhances legislative Investigations by deternng noncompliance. On the other
hand, as with JUdicial contempt, a-long line of decisions recogruzes its equivalence to
ordinary cnme for procedural purposes. Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 755
(1962); Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456, 471 (1961); Flaxer v. United States, 358
U.S. 147, 151 (1958); Sacher, 356 U.S. at 577; Watkms v. United States, 354 U.S. 178,
208 (1957); Sinclrur v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 291-92 (1929). Consequently, except
for m-the-chambers disruption of proceedings, congressional contempt IS analytically
and functionally mdistingmshable from ordinary cnme; as a result, any reservation of
prosecutonal discretion by Congress IS an Impermissible mtrus10n mto executive prerogatives and an unwarranted arrogation of power, plagued by the same potential for
mstitutional bias as the JUdictary's discretion to prosecute msults to its own authority.
141
See, e.g., United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F Supp. 150 (D.D.C.
1983); L. FISHER, supra note 126, at 211-13.
141
28 U.S.C.A. §§ 49, 591 et seq. (Supp. 1988).
139

140
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arat10n of powers concerns are rrused by tlus practice, 144 problems
presented by court-appomted special prosecutors are simply not
of the same magmtude as Young-approved mdirect cnmmal
contempt.
Ethics Act procedures are less Intrusive on prosecutonal
discretion than the JUdicial appOintment power approved m
Young. The Act gives the Attorney General a role In the decision
whether to prosecute. He decides Imtlally whether to conduct a
prelimmary InvestigatiOn. 145 After any such mvest1gat10n, he decides whether an mdependent counsel IS needed at all. 146 Neither
of these decisions Is JUdicially reviewable. 147 Thus, If the executive feels that prosecution Is unwarranted or detnmental, It can
block prosecutiOn-a prerogative unavailable to the executive In
Young. Further, the appomtments have express statutory authonzatiOn, sometlung not enJoyed by contempt appomtments. 148
The Attorney General also defines the scope of the mvestigation. As the Court construed the Act m Mornson, the Special
Division may not expand thts scope. 149 Any post-appomtment
duties It possesses, held the Court, are merely "m1mstenal." 150
The Attorney General, finally, Is empowered to remove the
special counsel. Although removal must be for "good cause" 151
144

See Rabkm and Devms, supra note 1 at 223-24. This essay will not assess the
correctness of MorriSon . In our VIew, whether or not Mornson was nghtly dectded,
mdirect cnmmal contempt 1s both an Improper self-aggrandizement of JUdicial power
and an unJustifiable limit on executive prosecutonal discretion.
14
s The Attorney General IS not compelled to act unless he determmes that the
mformation presented to h1m IS "sufficient to constitute grounds to mvestigate." 28
U.S.C.A. at § 591(a) (Supp. 1988).
146
Id. at § 592(b)(l).
147
See Banzhaf v. Srruth, 737 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Nathan v. Smith, 737
F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Accord Mornson v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2621 (1988)
("the Spectal Division has no power to appomt an mdependent counsel sua sponte; It
may only do so upon the specific request of the Attorney General, and the courts are
specifically prevented from revtewmg the Attorney General's deciSion not to seek appomtment).
148
Mornson emphasized this statutory attribute. Noting that the appomtments
clause authonzes Congress to vest appomtment of "infenor officers" "in the Courts of
Law," the Court effectively concluded that appomtments clause concerns were satisfied.
Momson , 108 S. Ct. at 2608-11.
9
"
!d. at 2613 nn. 17 & 18.
1
so Id. at 2613-14. Although the Special DivlSlon IS authonzed to termmate the
special counsel's office when her mvestigation JS clearly over, the Court found this
authority msignificant. Id.
1 1
s 28 U.S.C.A. at§ 596(a)(1) (Supp. 1988). The special counsel can also be removed
for any "condition that substantially Impairs the performance of [her] duties." ld.
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(thereby ensunng that the specml counsel possesses ''a degree of
mdependent discret10n" 152 to exercise her powers), this removal
power guards agrunst court-sponsored prosecutions based either
m malice or vmdictlveness.
The necessity rationale that supports the Ethics Act, moreover, IS much weightier than that advanced m Young. The
Watergate expenence IS only the most dramatic example of
possible abuse when executive officers are charged with policmg
themselves. 153 In contrast, conflict-of-mterest considerations work
for the opposite result In Young. A JUdge who feels slighted
may first select a champiOn to vmdicate his authonty and then
Sit In Judgment over the person who offered the slight. Mentless
prosecutions, overzealous executiOn, and disproportiOnate sentences are a likely consequence of such a scheme.
Most significant, JUdicial aggrandizement concerns which
plague mdirect cnffilnal contempt are less significant here. 154 The
Ethics Act places severe limits on the Special Division. The
Attorney General first determmes the need for an mdependent
counsel and then defines the scope of her mvesttgat10n. 155 Whether
and how the mdependent counsel bnngs forward her case are
also nonreviewable decisions. 156 Finally, Division members are

m

108 S. Ct. at 2608.

m

An 1dentical argument can be made With respect to contempt orders directed

agamst the executive. If Justice Department officials have sole authonty over the prosecution of such digressions, real conflict-of-mterest problems are present. Consequently,
the necessity JUStification for mdirect cnmmal contempt IS much stronger m such cases.
At the same time, the D.C. Circuit argued that there IS a Significant mstitutional
b1as withm the mdependent counsel's office: "The need to JUStify
an office dedicated
solely to one goal," and "the success of the office Itself, m the public's eyes," are
"umque mcenuves" to go forward and seek mdictments where they may not otherw1se
be appropnate. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 509-10 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev•d sub
nom., Mornson v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988). Mornson, however, found that Eth1cs
Act procedures are designed to avo1d a conflict of mterests. The Court concluded that,
smce the Spec1al DivlSlon has no power to rev1ew actions taken by either the Attorney
General or mdependent counsel, its actions will not be biased. Mornson, 108 S. Ct. at
2615. The Court also found Significant the Act's prohibition agrunst Division member
participation m mdependent counsel prosecutions. Id.
•s. Act procedures do allow for the stnppmg of power from the executive, however.
MorriSon found this depletion too msignificant to disrupt core executive functions. We
do not endorse th1s conclusiOn.
1
' ' See supra notes 145-52 and accompanymg text.
u 6 See supra note 153.
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prohibited from partictpatmg In special counsel prosecutions. 157
Each of these limitations stands In stark contrast to the
procedures approved m Young. While the special counsel proVISion does take responsibilities from the executive, It does not
give those responsibilities to another branch. In mdirect cnmmal
contempt actiOns, on the other hand, rmtlatlon, supervision, and
sentencmg are all controlled by the offended JUnst.
Neither the mdependent counsel provisions of the Ethics Act
or the Supreme Court's recent validatiOn of this practice reaffirms Young. The appOintment of mdependent counsels mfnnges
on executive prerogatives less, Increases only slightly the power
of article III courts, poses fewer threats of InJUStice m Individual
cases, and rests on a more compelling rationale than the appomtment of pnvate contempt prosecutiOns.
CONCLUSION
Young hmges on two false premises. Clrummg that cnmmal
contempt IS a noncnme subject to cnminal penalty, the Court
ducks the Issue of traditional prosecutonal discretion. The source,
scope, and purpose of cnmmal contempt, however, refute this
suggestiOn. Young views the enforcement of court orders as a
JUdicial functiOn, as opposed to an executive one. But mdirect
cnmmal contempt does not speak to essential JUdicial functions,
nor IS It a nonobtrusive means to preserve JUdicial authority
Instead, It Is an open Invitation to the JUdiciary to extend its
authonty mto the legislative sphere whenever It feels a litigant
has been unduly disrespectful.
At a time m the Court's history when great emphasis IS
placed on the need for the executive and Congress to stay within
their respective spheres of authonty, Young Is a remarkable,
unjustifiable, and unnecessary aggrandizement of JUdicial power.

1s7

See zd.

